We report empirical evidence regarding the disciplining role of different institutional and other owners in reducing managerial myopia. Using data from a large Nordic survey, we find that companies to a reasonably high degree feel that external pressure for a good result in the short-term generates conflict with the company's long-term goals. We test for the effect of several ownership types, and find that especially in firms with a large private equity owner the perceived pressure for short-term actions is reduced. In addition, we find a negative association between firm profitability and short-term pressure. We also find support for a behavioral characteristic: younger managers feel significantly more pressure. Firms subject to higher pressure undertake more actions to accommodate that pressure. Again, the impact of especially a large private equity owner is beneficial because such firms undertake significantly less often actions that are likely to destroy value, such as deprioritizing their long-term investments or R&D.
INTRODUCTION
A number of studies have reported evidence of various corporate actions that do not serve the long-term interests of the company or its shareholders (see, e.g., Klein, 2002; Brockman, Khurana, and Martin, 2008; Bushee, 1998 and 2001; Chakravarty and Grewal, 2011) . These actions include, among others, earnings manipulation, unnecessary cost cutting, or underinvestment.
1 One explanation offered for corporate myopia, or short-termism, is a short-term focus of the management. This managerial short-termism would stem from an unsolved agency problem between long-term shareholders and a more short-term management. Compensation systems with a short-term focus or short employment horizons, combined with weak corporate governance, have been suggested as the main drivers of such myopia (for empirical support, see, e.g., Marquardt, Tan, and Young, 2009 ).
However, short-termism may also be driven by the short time horizons of the owners rather than the managers. 2 The effects of ownership on managerial myopia have been studied both by looking at ownership concentration 3 and ownership type 4 (using, e.g., categories such as "institutional" or "transient" owners). The empirical evidence, however, remains rather mixed. Institutional ownership has been found to bring both advantages in terms of corporate governance and monitoring ability (see e.g. Lee, 2005) , as well as disadvantages through their frequent trading and the short-term compensation systems for institutional fund managers. Institutional investors also typically face severe diversification rules and other barriers for shareholder activism, limiting their role as active investors in individual firms (David and Kochhar, 1996; Edwards and Hubbard, 2000) . The category of institutional owners is also a mixed one, including both e.g. public pension funds often associated with a long-term focus, as well as investment funds and mutual funds, typically associated with a short time horizon (see e.g. the results by Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Grossman, 2002; Zouari and Rebai, 2009 , concerning their differenteffects on innovation strategies and earnings manipulation, respectively). Most studies have also used data pertaining to the U.S., where wide ownership dispersion and the dominance of institutional owners may make it difficult to find cross-sectional differences between firms.
Our paper contributes to the earlier literature in several ways. First, we add to the earlier literature on the effects of different owner types on managerial myopia using data from all the Nordic countries. Our study relates to papers which address heterogeneity among owners and owner types, such as Fiss and Zajac (2004) , and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) . The Nordic countries offer a very suitable environment for the study of the effects of large owners and owner types on myopia for a number of reasons. First, there is a large variation in ownership concentration as well as owner types between firms that are listed on the Nordic markets, ranging from large firms with multiple international listings and a dispersed ownership structure, to firms controlled by very large individual owners (such as private investors, financial institutions, industrial firms as well as a state or a municipality).
Such large cross-sectional differences in ownership concentration and type make it easier to isolate potential differences in ownership effects on myopia. Second, most Nordic firms have corporate boards that are dominated by external board members, typically including those representing the large owners. In that way, the voice of the large owner types is more likely to be heard already through board work rather than through the threat of exit.
In addition, we use a more detailed categorization of owner types than the ones used in the literature earlier, including a detailed analysis of various different institutional owner types including, as a novelty in this setting, private equity owners. Moreover, we directly study the short-term pressure felt by the management using survey data, and we furthermore contribute by studying the pressure felt by three different corporate executives/directors: the chairman of the board, the CEO, and the CFO. A study of their potentially differing roles in this respect has not been conducted earlier. Finally, instead of looking at one specific corporate action that may be affected by managerial myopia, we study the effect of shortterm pressure felt on a multitude of different actions, again using survey data. 5 We find that the pressure for short-term behavior is significantly reduced by the presence of private equity owner. Somewhat surprisingly, some large owner categories such as private owners are not able to reduce pressure for short-term actions. Firms subject to greater pressure also seem to undertake more actions to accommodate short-term pressure. We also find that the firms' profitability is negatively affected by the presence of the short-term pressure.
Our study combines three sources of data: (1) unique survey data on the perceived pressure for short-term decisions, its origins, and corporate reactions to it, (2) financial data on the actual characteristics and performance of firms, and (3) data on the largest owners and their type. Our survey data is based on responses to a questionnaire directed to the Chairmen, CEOs, and CFOs of all the companies listed on five Nordic stock exchanges (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) in 2007 and early 2008.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related literature in more detail and develop testable hypotheses. In section 3, the research design and methodology is presented. In section 4, we present the main empirical results together with a discussion of their implications. The final section presents our conclusions and offers some suggestions for further research.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The concept of short-termism or managerial myopia refers to an excess orientation towards short-term profits so that even decisions that compromise the long-term goals of the firm may be made. We will start by discussing the impact of large owners and owner types on the degree of short-term pressure felt. Next, we will discuss the potential consequences of short-term pressure, in terms of actions taken by the firm.
The impact of ownership and owner types
Theoretically, if agency problems can be avoided (e.g., alleviated through corporate governance mechanisms), the incentives of managers should be aligned with those of the owners. However, weak corporate governance, together with short-term incentives for the managers, can lead to agency problems and manager myopia. Myopia may for example lead to earnings manipulation, an unwillingness to invest (for instance, in R&D), and the use of discount rates or payback rules which are too demanding.
Even without agency problems, myopic behavior can occur at the firm level because of managers acting in the interest of owners who have a short-term focus. Next, we will analyse evidence on owner horizons associated with different owner types, starting first with large institutional (financial) owners and then continuing with other large investors.
Large institutional owners
Prior empirical research on the relationship between corporate ownership and managerial myopia has mainly studied the influence of large owners in general, or some specific owner types, on some individual corporate action where myopic decision making may be manifested in. Especially the role of institutional investors has been in focus (see Gillian and Starks, 2003 , for a survey of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance). As large shareholders, institutional investors can have greater incentives to be active owners and monitor the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Evidence supporting the myopia reducing role of institutional owners in the connection with R&D investments have been reported e.g. by Baysinger et al. (1991) , Hansen and Hill (1991) 6 , and Zahra (1996) , while contradictory results (a detrimental effect on R&D investments) have been reported e.g. by Graves (1988) , and in the survey by Graham et al. (2006) , where managers pointed out institutional investors as the main category of shareholders causing short-term behavior.
7
However, the group of institutional investors is a heterogeneous shareholder class, including both transient and more long-term owners. 8 Many institutional investors such as mutual fund managers face short-term compensation schemes tied to recent fund performance, and are involved in active trading, elements which can make their focus rather short-term, such as on returns from daily up to a yearly level. They also face severe diversification rules, limiting their role as large investors in individual firms (for an analysis of the barriers to shareholder activism faced by many institutional investors, see e.g. David and Kochhar, 1996; Edwards and Hubbard, 2000; David, Hitt, and Gimeno, 2001; Gillian and Starks, 2003) .
On the other hand, the group includes also more long-term owners such as pension funds, venture capitalists, and banks, which are more likely to be active investors and influence firms' decisions (Kochhar and David, 1996; David et al., 2001 reducing executive compensation, and shaping the firm's information environment.
Transient owners in turn can lead to actions targeted to short-term value creation, see e.g.,
by Bushee (1998 ), Chen et al. (2007 , and Burns et al. (2010) .
Very few papers have studied the effects of specific blockholder types (other than institutional investors) on short-term actions. Fiss and Zajac (2004) found that higher ownership by several ownership types which had adopted shareholder value orientation influenced the firm's orientation. These groups included, besides institutional owners, private owners and other firms as owners. Liljeblom and Vaihekoski (2009) find that in a sample of large, mainly unlisted firms, the pressure for short-term actions was smaller in firms categorized as owned by a more long-term owner (a private owner, the state 13 or a municipality, or a co-operative) as compared to listed firms, firms owned by private equity owners, foreign owners, as well as firms owned by another firm.
We will study blockholders, owning at least 20% of the equity, from the following categories:
state or municipality (STATE_MUN), a private owner (PRIVATE), a co-operative (CO_OP), and a non-financial firm (FIRM). Our expectation is that also a large blockholder other than an institutional owner might mitigate the pressure for short-term actions, but perhaps not by as much as an institutional owner (a financial institution or like) with better monitoring capability, and most likely better possibilities to finance the company. As typically well diversified owners, institutional owners may also be less sensitive to short-term swings in the profitability of the firm, as compared to e.g. many private owners as well as cooperatives who may be mostly relying on income from an individual firm.
13
Note that in the Nordic countries, the state is typically considered a long-term investor contrary to the USA where the long-term government ownership is frown upon (cf. General Motors).
Hypothesis 2: The pressure for short-term behavior is lower in firms where a large nonfinancial investor is present, but not as reduced as in the case of a long-term financial institutional owner.

2.2
Corporate actions undertaken in response to short-term pressure Next, we turn to corporate actions that may be caused by pressure to achieve good results in the short-term. Several studies have reported evidence about actions undertaken by firms to accommodate short-term pressure. Such actions may include paying a larger cash dividend or repurchasing more shares, see, e.g., Gaspar et al. (2005) . That is, they may lead to a change in the firm's dividend policy. Such changes in turn reduce equity and increase leverage (i.e., they affect the capital structure of the firm). In addition, in order to show better short-term profitability, firms may require a faster payback period for investments, withhold or postpone the use of capital even at the cost of rejecting profitable (NPV > 0)
long-term investment projects, cut down R&D expenditure, 14 and follow a more aggressive employment policy (leading to higher layoffs). Moreover, firms may change their financial reporting practices (see, e.g., Graham et al., 2006) . Finally, the results of, e.g., Clay (2000) indicate that shortsighted investment behavior can weaken the corporate governance mechanisms of a firm, leading to, e.g., higher levels of managerial compensation.
We study all the actions discussed above. We presented all respondents with a list of actions
and asked to what degree the firm uses them to adjust to the short-term pressure felt. We expect that firms subject to a higher pressure undertake actions to accommodate for the pressure to a higher degree. We also investigate the mitigating role of different large owners by studying whether companies with a large (potentially more long-term) owner of a certain type are less willing to undertake value-destroying actions.
14 For recent survey and evidence, see e.g. Osma and Young (2009) and Chakravarty and Grewal (2011) . A willingness to bypass profitable investments for the meeting of earnings targets (earnings smoothing) was also found by Graham et al. (2006) in their survey of CFOs in the U.S. Greenwood and Schor (2009) find that firms subject to entering activist owner experience a significant reduction in capital expenditures. 15 However, the questionnaires included some common questions, in particular, in relation to the short-term pressure felt. Our results utilize the common questions and some separate questions directed only to some respondent groups. Appendix 1 of this paper lists the questions used in the survey and to whom they were directed.
The survey was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the questionnaire was sent to respondents in Nordic firms listed on the exchanges operated by the OMX (now NASDAQ OMX), i.e., in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. This took place in early December 2007. In the second stage, in May 2008, the questionnaire was sent to the respondents in the firms listed at the Oslo Børs in Norway. The questionnaire was sent as a letter directed to a named respondent. The names and addresses of the respondents (i.e., the Chairmen of the Board, the CEOs, and the CFOs) were hand-compiled into a database. Ultimately, the questionnaire was sent to 780 firms with 2271 respondents (although three times 780 is 2340, 69 firms lacked specific CFOs).
15 Much work was put on the optimal design of the questionnaire. Prior to the actual survey, the questionnaire was also tested on subsets of executives / board members and like both in Sweden as well as in Finland.
The respondents were promised total anonymity (i.e., the responses and the identities of the respondents are available only to the researchers and the results are reported only as a group). Responses were obtained from 464 individual respondents representing 352 different firms; four respondents could not be identified (the questionnaire was returned without the identification code). The overall response rate was 20.4%, ranging from 10.3%
for Norway to 29.3% for Sweden. 16 The Chairmen were the most active respondents (158 responses), although the response rate was almost the same for all categories of the respondents. Table 1 report the response rates per country and respondent category.
Background data
The responses were matched with background information on firm financials, ownership concentration, and main owner type. The financial data was collected from three sources.
Our primary source was the Amadeus database, for lacking items complemented by data from Datastream. Finally, annual reports downloaded from the web provided an additional data source in cases where information was not available in other databases. The financials are from the last reporting year ending before the questionnaire was sent out; mainly yearend 2006 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden, and 2007 for Norway. Year-end exchange rates were used to convert all financials to the same currency, the euro, which is already the currency of Finland. Financial data was collected, not only for responding firms, but also for the whole market. This facilitated relating our sample to the whole population surveyed. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the responding firms and the whole population, and these were recorded separately for financial and non-financial firms. 17 The value of solidity is not reported for the financial firms due to cross-sectional differences in 16 The response rate can be considered to be high for this kind of surveys. For example, Graham et al. (2006) had a response rate of 10.4 per cent in their study.
17 Many studies restrict their sample strictly to industrial firms, since financial variables such as solidity, and the value of total assets, are on a very different level for financials vs. non-financials. Since our prime focus is the responses to the questionnaire, which do not suffer from differences in measurement, we keep all respondents included. However, we also perform robustness tests using only non-financial firms.
how it is reported (the financial firms group is very heterogeneous and includes, e.g., listed funds or investment companies, as well as insurance companies). Table 2 shows that the firms that chose to take part in our study are marginally larger than the population of firms to which the questionnaire was sent. This holds for the non-financial firms (285 in our sample) for all size related variables, but is true for the financials only in terms of turnover. Our non-financial firms are also marginally less profitable (having a lower return on assets, i.e., ROA), whereas the 57 financials firms in our sample are more profitable. The differences are, however, small and not statistically significant. We therefore conclude that our sample represents the total population quite well.
Ownership data for the firms was collected primarily from Amadeus and secondarily from annual reports obtained from the internet. The Amadeus data represents the ownership situation at the time the survey was taken, whereas the data from the annual reports is from the last reporting year prior to the survey. We collected data on the ownership share (percentage equity) of the largest shareholder, and owner name. 18 Annual reports as well as internet sources were used to gather information about the largest owner for classification purposes. Private owners (individuals, families) were the largest owner type; 39 percent of 464 respondents worked for such a company, followed by a non-financial firm (16%), mutual funds (14%), activist investors (11%), banks, insurance companies and pension funds (10%), endowment (4%), state or municipality (3%), and co-operatives (1%). Our private owners include both individuals as well as families. Activist investors, on the other hand, include private equity and venture capitalists, and a few hedge funds, whereas endowments include different types of charities and like. We were unable to identify the biggest owner for sixteen companies.
18 Since pyramiding is not that common in the Nordic countries, the first level of ownership has mostly turned out to also be the ultimate ownership level (i.e. the largest controlling owner typically turns out to be a private person, directly owning the shares, or e.g. a listed firm with a wide-spread ownership, or a large pension fund). We have made efforts to search for the ultimate owner by searching for the owners of small investment companies, which often turn out to be fully owned by one individual or a few members of a family. Such observations are classified as privately owned firms. Our largest owner types are: private (43% of the large owners), another firm (18%), an investment fund (12%), or an activist owner (11%).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Perceived pressure for short-term results
Our first hypothesis concerns the overall level of pressure to obtain good results in the shortterm, and its relationship to the existence of a large owner of a certain type in the firm. We asked all respondents (Chairmen, CEOs and CFOs) to indicate the degree to which they have experienced external expectations to generate pressure which is in conflict with the long- In order to test our hypothesis 1, we estimate an ordered probit model using the reported scores for pressure as the dependent variable. As explanatory variables in the base-case, we include first of all sector dummies (industrials and energy, consumer products, IT, and financial firms), and a country dummy for Iceland, the county with on average the highest values for our pressure variable. 19 Because the pressure can be reported by the CEOs, the CFOs, or the CMs, we also include two dummy variables: a CEO-dummy and CFO-dummy.
Using these coefficients allows us to test for significant differences between these respondent categories versus the chairman, for whom the pressure on average is the lowest, while controlling for other factors.
We also add a variable for the age of the respondent. Fiss and Zajac (2004) included CEO age in their model for shareholder value adaptation, and found that when interacted with an economics or law degree, it had a significant negative effect on the likelihood of a firm espousing a shareholder value orientation. We expect that age proxies for experience and greater independence, and helps in reducing the pressure for short-term actions felt by the respondent. I.e. we expect a negative sign for our variable Resp_age.
To control for external determinants, we include financial variables for size (measured by the natural logarithm of total assets) and profitability (measured as the return on assets, ROA, defined as net profit in percentage of total assets). We expect that the pressure is larger in less profitable firms, whereas for size we do not have a clear ex ante expectation.
Finally, we add our key owner type variables, first for six main owner types: INST for financial institutions and like as large owners, FIRM for a non-financial firm as a large owner, PRIVATE for a large private owner, and CO_OP for a co-operative as a large owner. These variables are dummies taking the value of one if the largest owner owns more than 20% of the equity in the firm, and belongs to the group in question. Later, we refine our definition for a large institutional owner, using the categories of banks, pension funds, and insurance companies (BANK_PENS_INS), funds and investment companies (FUND), activists (ACTIVIST), and endowments (ENDOWM) as owners. Our model is thus:
Short-term pressure =  0 +  1 (sector-dummy) +  2 (Iceland-dummy) +  3 (CEO-dummy) +  4 (CFO-dummy) +  5 (Resp_age) +  6 (Owner type variables) +  7 (Control variables) + ,
where short-term pressure is a response variable ranging from 1 to 5, a CEO-dummy (CFOdummy) is a binary variable that equals one if the response is given by a CEO (CFO) and zero otherwise, Resp_age is the age of the respondent, and the owner type variables are indicator variables taking the value of 1 if the largest owner owns 20% of the equity of the firm or more and belongs to a certain owner type category, and zero otherwise. The control variables include ln(total_assets) and ROA (defined as net profit divided by the total assets). 20 Also sector dummies and a country dummy for Iceland are included.
The results from the estimation of a base-case model without owner type variables are reported in Column A of Table 4 . The CEO-dummy is significant at the 5% level, indicating that a CEO experiences a significantly higher pressure for short-term results than the CM, which has no dummy. The pressure felt by the CFO, in turn, is not significantly different from that by the CM. Both financial control variables, ln(total_assets) and ROA, are negative and significant. The results for ROA are in line with our prior expectation, as for size, we did not have an ex ante expectation. The results indicate that executives in larger and more profitable firms feel less pressured towards undertaking short-term actions.
Other interesting findings from Table 4 , column A, include the dummy for Iceland, as well as
Resp_age. Iceland is the only country deviating significantly from the others, with higher pressure for short-term actions felt. This is an interesting observation, since the survey was made in December 2007, i.e. before the main outburst of the financial crisis in Europe in fall 2008, which had a huge effect on the Icelandic economy. Clearly, some country factor, such as the pyramiding ownership structures in Icelandic firms in combination with higher leverage levels, induced such higher short-term pressure already at this stage. The other interesting finding is related to respondent age. A significant negative coefficient for the variable supports our expectation of lower pressure felt by more experienced (older) respondents.
In Column B, the main owner type variables have been included. The sign for INST is negative as expected, but the variable is not quite significant which reflect the heterogeneity of the institutional investor class. In column C, INST is divided intodifferent types of institutional owners. According to our hypothesis 1, we expect a negative sign for such institutional owners which are more likely to have a long-term focus, i.e. BANK_PENS_INS, ENDOWM, and ACTIVIST as compared to FUND. The results in Table 4 , column C, show that the signs for all institutional owners are negative, indicating less pressure for short-term actions as compared to other large owners, but the coefficients for FUND as well as BANK_PENS_INS are rather small, and they are insignificant, as is ENDOWM. Activist ownership in turn significantly reduces the pressure for undertaking short-term actions.
Next, we perform some robustness tests. In Column D, we run the model used for in Column C, but exclude financial firms. Now not only activist ownership, but also ownership by endowments, significantly reduces short-term pressure. These results are in line with our hypothesis 1 for activist owners and endowments, but not for banks, pension funds and insurance companies as large owners. According to our hypothesis 2, we expect that also Table 5 .
Panel A of Table 5 shows the results for the full sample. The highest score is given for the action financial reporting (3.159) followed by corporate governance (2.986). These are actions that are not necessarily value destroying. However, we also see that actions such as long-term investment (2.887), R&D expenditure (2.430), and required rate / payback period (2.623) yield reasonably high scores. These actions are more problematic because reducing or postponing investment, using a higher rate of return than motivatedby project risk, or using a shorter payback period, are likely to destroy economic value. Panels B through D of Governance dominating in all categories.
CFOs were given one alternative that was not available to the others, namely "Special press releases" (not reported in Table 5 ). The number of respondents here was 139, out of which 16.5 percent considered the alternative as irrelevant for the company. The mean and standard deviation of the responses are 2.784 and 1.133, respectively.
In order to test our hypothesis 3, we investigate the pairwise correlations between the responses to the overall question of short-term pressure, and these responses on actions.
The correlations are all reasonably high, the lowest one being 0.16 (corporate governance) and the highest being 0.39 (hiring / layoff decisions). In ordered probit regressions, using the general scores for the short-term pressure as the explanatory variable and these action responses as the dependent variables each in turn, the slope coefficient is always significant at the 1% level (the z-values ranged from 2.54 for compensation design to 5.28 for the required rate / payback period and 1.92 for the alternative special press releases that was only offered to CFOs). These results are reported in Panel E of Table 5 . They give strong support to hypothesis 3, suggesting that companies that feel a stronger short-term pressure are also more likely to adjust their actions.
We also expect (as specified in hypothesis 4) that the willingness to accommodate for shorttermism is related to the factors that create this pressure, such as the owner type (the time horizon of the owner). To test for this, we regress the same model as in Column C of Table 4 , now replacing the dependent variable from general short-term pressure (on a scale form 1 to 5) to the response variable concerning a specific action variable (again on a scale from 1 to 5). I.e. we test whether the degree to which a specific action is undertaken in response to short-term pressure is influenced by the firm's main owner's type. Hypothesis 4 suggests that a long-term institutional owner would reduce the pressure for short-termism, in which case firms also undertake fewer actions to adjust to such a pressure. We estimated the model for each action variable, one by one, using a multivariate ordered probit model with robust standard errors. Although the model includes our full list of owner type variables, Table 6 only reports the coefficients for our three test variables, ACTIVIST, BANK_PENS_INS,
and ENDOWM. Table 6 shows that also in this model, activist ownership typically significantly reduces the need to undertake actions to accommodate for short-term pressure, and also ENDOWM does it for certain actions (but is significantly positive for compensation design).
In summary, we find strong support for our hypothesis 3, and also for our hypothesis 4 as far as activist owners are concerned. There is a strong significant relationship between our action variables and our short-term pressure variable, supporting the expectation that firms, in which a higher pressure for short-term actions is felt, also are more likely to undertake such actions. The likelihood for such actions is in turn significantly reduced by the presence of a large owner of one specific type, activists.
Additional considerations and robustness tests
We also perform some additional robustness test of hypothesis 1. First, we estimate the sensitivity of our results to the scale (1 to 5 for pressure) used in the survey by re-estimating our main models in Table 4 using only the responses that are different from 3 (the intermediate pressure category), and excluding chairman responses. Although we lose a substantial number of observations, the main model is robust to this change and the coefficient for activists is still significantly negative. We also perform other robustness tests.
The results in Table 4 , column C, are e.g. robust to the inclusion of a full set (four, i.e. all but one) country dummies. The results concerning activists are also robust to using a probit model where only a binary variable, indicating a high (4 or 5) or a low level of pressure felt.
Finally, we perform additional tests to study whether the short-term pressure in the questionnaire is indeed negative (harmful) for the firm. In the survey, we tried to control for this by carefully formulating the main question; we tried not to ask about the short-term pressure as such, but the extent to which the short-term external expectations are in conflict with the long-term goals of the firm. In order to test further for what the responses we obtained are a proxy for, we regress firm profitability on our pressure variable, including also typical firm level controls (size and solidity). Because studies of the relationship between corporate control and firm performance have indicated that the existence of a large owner can be beneficial at least to a certain point (due to reduced agency costs) until an entrenchment effect may kick in (i.e., another type of conflict may be created, this time between the large controlling owner and other owners; typically associated with the large owner having voting rights in excess of control rights), 21 we also include OWN_20, a variable measuring the percentage of equity owned by the largest owner. The results are reported in Table 7 for different model specifications.
The results in Table 7 show that our pressure variable is -together with firm size -one of the strongest explanatory variables for firm performance as measured through either ROA or ROE. Additional specification tests (not reported here) show that pressure is equally significant when the variable OWN_20 in Table 7 is replaced by the same eight dummies for different types of large investors as used in the models in columns C and D of Table 4 . Our pressure variable yields consistently a negative sign, supporting the idea that what we have captured through our survey is indeed the kind of pressure for short-term results that is negatively related to profitability.
Naturally, the results in Tables 4 and 7 are subject to the issue of endogeneity due to the uncertainty of the direction of a causal relationship. Observing lower short-term pressure in companies with activist owners can be caused by the either by a true causal relationship from ownership to the company, but the relationship can also run the other way around.
I.e., activists may choose to invest in companies with lower agency costs and as a result, the pressure to perform in the short-run is low.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper builds on earlier results from several studies indicating that short-term pressure may influence firms to undertake actions that sacrifice economic value in order to meet short-term benchmarks. We focus especially on the question whether a large, long-term institutional owner can mitigate such pressure for short-termism. Although the effects of institutional owners have been subject to a number of studies, the results are typically mixed and indicate that the category of institutional owners include both owners with a short horizon (such as mutual funds and investment companies) as well as owners with a longer horizon. E.g. public pension funds have been suggested as examples of owners with a longer horizon, see e.g. Kochhar and David (1996) , Hoskisson et al. (2002) , and Zouari and Rebai (2009), whereas mutual funds have been blamed for their frequent trading and short-term performance incentives (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2002; Suto and Toshino, 2005) .
We contribute to the earlier literature by studying a broad category of different owner types, including several subgroups of institutional owners. We study the effect of owner type in a rich dataset including, from five Nordic countries, CEO, CFO, and chairman responses both concerning the degree of short-term pressure felt, as well as their willingness to undertake a set of actions in order to accommodate for such a pressure. The Nordic markets offer an excellent opportunity to study the impacts of different types of large owners, as there is substantial variation in ownership levels and types as compared to, e.g., the U.S., where firms are typically widely held and where institutional owners dominate. Using recent survey data for 464 executives from firms listed in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden accompanied with information on firm financials and the percentage of equity of the largest owners in the firm, and owner types, we studied the levels, determinants, and consequences of perceived short-term pressure.
Our main results relate to the impact of a specific active owner type, activists. We add to the literature on the performance effects by active ownership (see e.g. David et al., 2001; Mietzner et al., 2008) by reporting on the short-term pressure reducing effects of activists.
The results are interesting, since they are in contradiction with some earlier results (e.g.
Greenwood and Schor, 2009) where entering activists instead seem to cause actions which may be interpreted as a reduction in the long-term focus of the firm (such as a significant reduction in capital expenditures). We in turn find that in firms with a large activist owner, significantly less pressure for short-term actions is felt, and significantly less need to undertake actions (such as changes in R&D investments) to accommodate for such pressure are undertaken. In this way, our results relate to the recent findings of, e.g., Klein (2002), Becker et al. (2011) , as well as Brockman and Yan (2009) , who indicate that a large shareholder or a large and active blockholder can have an effect in, e.g., reducing earnings manipulation, increasing the profitability of the firm, reducing executive compensation, and shaping the firm's information environment.
We also add to prior studies by looking at some behavioral differences. First, we look at different director categories separately (the CEO, the CFO, and the Chairman of the board).
This distinction has not been made before in studies of short-term effects. Among the executives, the CEO feels the strongest pressure, followed by the CFO. In line with e.g. Fiss
and Zajac (2004) in a study of the adaptation of shareholder value, we include the age of the respondent. In line with our expectation concerning the effect of experience, we find that older respondents feel significantly less pressure for short-term actions.
Our results contribute to the literature on short-term pressure and to the corporate governance literature concerning the effects of corporate control. The results indicate that the need to put corporate governance mechanisms in place to reduce managerial myopia are of special interest in firms that are subject to a higher pressure for short-term results due to the lack of an active owner. Our results indicate that activist ownership is especially beneficial in this sense. The need for such incentives is also stronger for young managers, as older executives seem to be less sensitive to such short-term pressure. Such mechanisms include, e.g., compensation systems with a longer-term focus. from one to five) one by one on the same explanatory variables as in model C in Table 4 again using a multivariate ordered probit-model. We report only the coefficients obtained for three institutional owner type variables, i.e. the ownership types which we according to our hypothesis 1 expected to most reduce pressure for short-term actions: ACTIVIST, BANK_PENS_INS, and ENDOWM. The models are estimated using robust standard errors. Z-scores are provided below the parameter estimates. * denotes significance at least at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level, one-sided tests. This table reports the results from regressing firm profitability, measured either through ROA (return on total assets, columns A to C) or ROE (return on equity, columns D to F) on our survey variable for the shortterm pressure (pressure, with values ranging from 1 to 5) and firm controls: ln(total_assets), the logarithm of total assets, as a proxy for size; solidity, equity to total assets, as a firm level risk variable; and OWN_20, the percentage of equity owned by the largest owner, as proxy for the benefits of corporate control. Columns A reports the base-case using all observations that do not lack data points, Column B only for the non-financial firms, and Column C using only oneobservation per firm and the average firm level pressure measure. Columns D to F report the same models using ROE instead of ROA. All models are estimated using robust and clustered standard errors for observations from the same firm. T-values are provided below the parameter estimates. * denotes significance at least at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level, one-sided tests. 
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